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1. Introduction 
The question we are addressing is what restrictions should be placed 
on Pemex's marketing activities in the natural gas market. To address 
this question, it is useful to review what are probably well-accepted 
public-interest goals for regulation.
1 These include the efficient al-
location of resources, achieving some redistributive goals, simplicity, 
and transparency. With these goals in mind, it is clear that the de-
cision to link the price of natural gas in Mexico to the price at the 
Houston ship channel by a netback rule solves some very difficult 
technical and institutional problems in a very simple fashion.
2 The 
netback rule links the price of gas at any point in Mexico to the price 
of gas in Houston adjusted by the cost of transportation. The natural 
gas market in Mexico then has all the properties of the gas market at 
Houston. In particular, all agents are price takers with respect to the 
market and the Houston market can be used by agents in Mexico for 
hedging and other forward contracts. The key to the implementation 
of this policy is that there be sufficient pipeline capacity so that the 
gas markets can clear and rents do not accrue to the pipelines. If there 
is not sufficient pipeline capacity so that the natural gas markets in 
Mexico can clear at the Houston netback prices, it is impossible to 
implement the netback rule. At the net back price, demand will be 
greater than supply. 
A proposal that is being discussed is to change the system so 
that Pemex sells gas only at the point of injection.
3 The prices in the 
local markets would be set by local supply and demand conditions. 
These changes would create uncertainty in the gas market and also 
create the possibility of strategic manipulation of the price of gas that 
would be very difficult to regulate. Further, the current regulations 
permit the net back price to be an upper bound and Pemex can sell 
gas below that price if it does so in a nondiscriminatory fashion. 
The reason that has been given for allowing Pemex to sell at 
a price below the Houston netback price, as long as the sales were 
non-discriminatory, is that there is no reason to restrict voluntary 
transaction between parties. However, there is a substantial agency 
1 Political economy goals of regulation are more general since interest group 
pressure could influence the design of regulatory institutions, regulatory frame-
works, and industry structures (see Laffont (2000)). 
2 See Brito and Rosellón (2002). 
3 Future challenges of the Mexican natural gas reform are discussed in Comi-
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problem in these transactions. It is hard to understand why Pemex 
(acting as a agent for the Mexican people) would want to sell gas 
in Mexico for less than it could net by selling the gas in Houston. 
There may be policy reasons to subsidize gas in certain circumstances; 
however, this does not seem like a decision that should be delegated 
to Pemex gas marketing. 
Pemex should be permitted to enter into spot contracts or future 
contracts to sell gas. However, the price of gas should always be 
the net back price based on the Houston Ship Channel at the time 
of delivery. Pemex should not be permitted to discount the price 
of gas from the Houston netback price even in a nondiscriminatory 
fashion. This arrangement is transparent, it is easy to enforce and 
does not eliminate any legitimate market options for any of the parties 
involved. Pemex or consumers of gas can use the Houston market for 
hedging of speculative transactions. 
The Houston market can also serve as a buffer for fluctuations 
in Pemex's production or in demand. Pemex can vary its sales in 
the Houston market to smooth fluctuations in Mexico.
4 This buffer 
allows Pemex to only sell "plain vanilla" gas without having to engage 
in complex market operations in Mexico. Thus, it is very difficult to 
see what useful role can be played by Pemex acting as a gas marketer 
in Mexico. If Pemex wants to engage in speculative market behavior, 
it can do so in the Houston market. Houston has the advantage of 
being a well-developed market. Pemex's transactions in that market 
would not create any regulatory issues for the Comisión Reguladora 
de Energía, CEE, as long as Pemex sells gas in Mexico at the Houston 
spot netback price. As long as there is sufficient pipeline capacity so 
that there are no bottlenecks in transporting gas, this simple rule will 
result in an efficient and transparent natural gas market in Mexico. 
Allowing Pemex discretion in pricing gas becomes an even more 
complicated problem if Pemex is allowed to sell gas for future delivery 
at a price other than the Houston netback price at the time of delivery. 
For example, Pemex can sell gas for delivery 30 days in the future at 
a given price and the next day sell gas for delivery 29 days in the 
future a different price. Technically, these transactions would not 
be discriminatory. Transactions that involve selling forward gas at 
a predetermined price would be very difficult to monitor and give 
Pemex gas marketers a very large amount of power and discretion. 
There are important and legitimate reasons why private oil com-
panies use forward markets to reduce risk; let us grant that such 
4 This assumes that Pemex is exporting gas. 18 ESTUDIOS ECONÓMICOS 
reasons may also apply a national oil company such as Pemex. Re-
stricting Pemex to sell gas in Mexico at the Houston spot market 
netback price does not eliminate any options for Pemex. Linking the 
price of gas in Mexico to the Houston market permits Pemex to oper-
ate in these sophisticated markets with out involving their customers 
for gas delivered in Mexico. Further, buyers of natural gas in Mex-
ico can enter into transactions in Houston without involving Pemex. 
Thus, there is no economic reason why Pemex has to operate as a gas 
marketer in Mexico. 
It may seem more efficient to permit Pemex to enter into such 
transactions directly in Mexico without going through the Houston 
market. However, due to the vertical integration of Pemex in the gas 
industry, restricting Pemex to make such transactions only in the well 
developed Houston market reduces the possibility that Pemex could 
to set entry barriers to other participants in the gas commercialization 
business, reduces the regulatory burden in Mexico, and permits the 
development of proper market institutions in Mexico for futures and 
forward contracts. 
2. Problems with Flexibility in the Netback Rule 
The present regulations permit Pemex to sell gas at below the Hous-
ton netback price as long as it does so in a nondiscriminatory fashion. 
This policy is supported by the received wisdom in regulatory the-
ory that holds that prohibiting a voluntary transaction on the part 
of two competent parties does not improve welfare.
5 However, this 
result does not apply in this case. The linkage to Houston means that 
all parties in the Mexican market are price takers. Since Mexican gas 
can always be sold in Houston, the value of the marginal cubic foot of 
gas at the well in Mexico is the Houston price less cost of transport. 
We will demonstrate that a policy to sell at the Houston netback price 
is Kaldor-Hicks superior to a policy that discounts the price of gas in 
a nondiscriminatory fashion.
6 
5 Suppose the regulator forces the firm to charge prices P°. Total welfare 
would be V(P°) + Q7r(P°), where Vis consumer surplus, 7T is profits and Q in 
[0,1). If the firm is allowed to offer P such that V (P) > V(P°), this alternative 
policy would not make consumers worse off and the firm would make a greater 
profit. (See Armstrong, Cowan, and Vickers (1994), p.67). 
6 Under the Kaldor-Hicks test, state A is preferred to state B if those who 
gain from the move to A can hypothetical^ compensate those who lose and yet GAS MARKETING ACTIVITIES IN MEXICO 19 
Figure 1 
It is Kaldor-Hicks superior to have the price of gas in Mexico 
equal to the Houston price adjusted for transportation costs. Assume 
that gas is produced at Burgos and shipped to Houston and Mon-
terrey.
7 Let pH be the spot price at Houston and pM be the spot 
price at Monterrey. Let ch be the cost of moving gas from Burgos 
to Houston, cm be the cost of moving gas from Burgos to Monterrey. 
The netback rule would lead to the condition that the price of gas 
less transport cost is the same at Houston and Monterrey, 
Pm-Cm = Ph-Ch (1) 
Suppose a customer in Monterrey had a demand curve Q* = 
Di(P) for the gas. Pemex can sell the gas to the customer in Monterrey 
be better off. The Kaldor-Hicks criterion suggests that A is preferable even if 
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or sell the gas in Houston. Suppose Pemex sold the consumer Qi 
amount of gas at p < pm. It is feasible for Pemex to sell the gas 
in Houston and transfer an amount ApQ, + to the Monterrey 
consumer. (See figure l).
8 This would lead to greater revenue, 
to Pemex and make the Monterrey consumer no worse off. Thus it is 
Kaldor-Hicks superior to have the price of gas in Mexico equal to the 
Houston netback price and sell the balance of the gas on the Houston 
market rather than to sell gas in Mexico at a price below the Houston 
netback price. 
3. Regulation of Pipeline Rates 
Pipelines have a high fixed cost, and for a substantial portion of their 
operating region low marginal costs. The capacity of the pipeline is 
ultimately limited by the pressure limits of pipe. Figure 2 illustrates 
the cost curves for a 48-inch pipeline 100 miles long.
9 The dashed 
lines represent what the cost curves would be if the pressure limits 
were not binding. At a pressure limit of 1,500 pounds per square inch, 
the pipeline reaches its limit at approximately 3,800 million cubic feet 
per day. At this point it becomes impossible to increase throughput 
by increasing power and it becomes necessary to add compressor sta¬
tions which increases throughput without exceeding the line limit by 
increasing the pressure gradient. 
We have shown that the netback-pricing rule ia the solution of 
a static welfare optimization problem if the fee for transporting gas 
is the marginal cost of transporting gas.
1
0
 However, marginal-cost 
pricing results in a loss of rents. (See figure 2). One solution to this 
problem is to set a fee that yields a regulated rate of return over the 
life of the project sufficient to cover all costs. An alternative, more 
sophisticated alternative is a two-part tariff with a price cap. CRE 
currently regulates Pemex transportation (and distribution) tariffs 




Recall that under the netback rule, the revenue after transportation costs of 
selling gas in Houston or Monterrey would be the same. 
9 The parameters used in constructing this example are based on numbers 
reported in the Oil & Gas Journal, November 27, 1995. 
10. See Brito and Rosellon (2002), and Brito, Littlejohn and Rosellon (2000). 
1
1
 Pemex estimates its fixed, variable and financial transportation costs (in-
cluding an 11.5 percent rate of return) and sets its two-part tariff according to its 
revenue requirements. GAS MARKETING ACTIVITIES IN MEXICO 21 
cap prevails during each five-year period. The initial value of the cap 
is set in each period through cost of service and adjusted by infla-
tion, efficiency, pass through and correction factors. Average revenue 
is calculated as the ratio of total revenue to output in the current 
period. Ramirez and Rosellon (2002) show that this regime creates 
a stochastic effect that implies higher levels of consumer surplus for 




More generally, the economics literature on gas (and electricity) 
transportation shows how usage congestion charges can be used to 
l
i
 We must point out that when only one product is supplied, as in the trans-
portation service, average-revenue regulation coincides with tariff-basket regula-
tion. For the case of gas distribution, Ramirez and Rosellon (2002) also show that 
the CRE's average-revenue regime creates incentives for setting two-part tariffs 
strategically. The usage charge is typically dropped to its lowest feasible level 
while the fixed charge can be raised to compensate for the loss of operating profit. 22 ESTUDIOS ECONÓMICOS 
give proper incentives for capacity investments.
1
3
 However, there are 
two caveats to the use of a flexible pricing mechanism to regulate Pe-
mex transportation tariffs that seem to make preferable a fixed-price 
regulation that does not allow Pemex to carry out price discounts.
1
4 
The first problem is Pemex's vertical integration in gas production, 
transportation, and marketing, which allows Pemex to carry out cross 
subsidies among these three economic activities. A second problem is 
the limited institutional capacity of a small regulator to obtain true 
cost information on all segments of the more than 9,000-kilometer-
long Pemex transportation network. Under these conditions, Pemex 
could strategically manipulate pipeline rates to maximize its revenues 
but reduce consumer surplus. 
As an example of the latter assertion, suppose Pemex is pro-
ducing gas in Burgos and Ciudad Pemex, and selling gas in Houston 
and Mexico City (see figure 3. The arrows indicate which way gas 
is moving). Los Ramones is the arbitrage point. Assume that tx is 
the "real" (cost-reflective) price per mile for transporting gas through 
the pipeline segment Burgos-Los Ramones and through the Ciudad 
Pemex-Mexico City segment. Let i2 be the corresponding price for 
the Houston-Burgos segment and the Los Ramones-Ciudad Pemex 
segment (ti < i2).
1
5
 The dashed line in figure 4 illustrates the regu-
lated price pattern that would result under perfect information. 
Suppose however that the regulator does not have information 
on the real cost in each pipeline segment, and that Pemex can set a 
price for transporting gas through the pipeline network in the range 
between tx and t2 per mile. Pemex can then exploit its flexibility to 
set the pipeline tariffs to increase revenues. Pemex can charge the 
1
3
 Vogelsang (2001) proves how a two-part tariff can be used to solve short-run 
congestion problems as well as the long-run capacity expansion problems of an 
electricity transmission network. Under capacity congestion, the variable charge 
becomes a pure congestion charge and, whenever congestion charges are greater 
than the marginal costs of increasing capacity, the transmission company will have 
incentives to expand capacity. 
1
4
 This is not equivalent to the use of cost-of-service regulation. Rather, we 
propose to keep calculating the initial value of the (average revenue) cap in each 
regulatory period through cost of service and adjust it along the period by inflation 
and efficiency factors, but without allowing price discounts. 
1
5
 Then, according to the netback pricing rule, the price of gas at Mexico City 
will be equal to the benchmark price in Houston less the transport costs from 
Houston to Burgos, plus the transport costs from Burgos to Los Ramones, less 
the transport costs from Los Ramones to Ciudad Pemex, plus the transport costs 







low transport charge tx between Houston - Burgos, the high transport 
charge t2 between Burgos - Los Ramones, the low transport charge h 
between Los Ramones - Ciudad Pemex and the high transport charge 
t2 between Ciudad Pemex - Mexico City. This is illustrated by the 
solid line in figure 4. This pricing policy maximizes the revenues 
for Pemex by cross-subsidizing its pipeline segments. The result is 
a higher price of gas in Mexico as compared to the one that would 
prevail if Pemex charged the real transport charges per segment. 
The CRE then needs Pemex to provide accurate information on 
its transport costs by segment. Under the vertically integrated struc-
ture of Pemex, which allows cross-subsidization among gas produc-
tion, transportation and marketing, the regulator should implement 
a fix-price regulation by transportation region so that Pemex cannot 
make discounts in transportation charges. Of course, the (first) best 
solution would be to vertically separate Pemex -allowing unbundling 
and competition in marketing- and to regulate transportation charges 
with the incentive scheme already in place. 
4. Pemex Selling Gas Only at the Point of Injection 
One advantage of using the netback rule with a fixed fee for trans-
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the pipeline. Restricting Pemex to sell gas only at the point of in-
jection and allowing local market conditions to set the price creates 
the possibility that marketers could acquire some degree of market 
power. Parties could buy the gas at the point of injection and ship 
either to the Houston market (where they face an essentially flat de-
mand curve) or to the Mexican markets where they face an inelastic 
demand curve. Collusive behavior on the part of marketers would 
allow them to equate marginal revenue in both markets and exploit 
the fact that demand curves in the local markets are very inelastic 
and earn monopoly rents. It then becomes necessary to regulate the 
activities of the marketers. The regulatory problem is much simpler 
if Pemex sells at all points on the pipeline system Using the netback 
rule to determine the price. This would not eliminate other marketers' 
activities. 
5. Forward Markets and Pipeline Capacity 
If Pemex is required to sell gas on the spot market at the Houston 
Ship Channel price adjusted by the netback rule, can Pemex use GAS MARKETING ACTIVITIES IN MEXICO 25 
its monopoly power over the pipeline to get monopoly rents in this 
forward market? To address this question let us consider a simple 
model. Assume a two period model. Gas is produced at Burgos 
and shipped to Houston and Monterrey. Let poh be the spot price at 
Houston at time 0, p0m the spot price at Monterrey at time 0, pxh the 
spot price at Houston at time 1, plm the spot price at Monterrey at 
time 1, ph the forward price at Houston at time 0, and pm the forward 
price at Monterrey at time 0. Let ch be the cost of moving gas from 
Burgos to Houston, cm be the cost of moving gas from Burgos to 
Monterrey, and Ac = cm - ch. Let Qm be the capacity constraint 
on the pipeline from Burgos to Monterrey. If the capacity constraint 
does not bind, the netback price at Monterrey is Prm = prh+Ac, (see 
figure 6 left). If the capacity constraint binds, the price at Monterrey 
is Prm = Prh + Ac + R, where R are the rents associated with the 
capacity constraint, (see figure 6 right). 
Figure 5 
i 4 . > • 
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Figure 6 
If the pipeline capacity does not bind, anyone who desires to engage 
in forward transactions can do so in the Houston market and Pemex 26 ESTUDIOS ECONÓMICOS 
does not have an effective monopoly of the forward market and will 
capture no rents. However, if the pipeline capacity does bind, Pemex 
can capture the rents associated with the pipeline constraint by selling 
output forward. Pemex can become a monopoly in the forward firm-
service market. Note that if the pipeline capacity does bind, rents 
will exist and the only question is who will appropriate them. Given 
that the capacity constraint on the pipeline is binding, there are no 
real effects. 
The key regulatory issue in this context appears to be insuring 
that Pemex invests sufficiently in pipeline capacity so that capacity 
constraints are not a serious issue. 
6. Optimal Pipeline Capacity 
A necessary element in implementing a policy where the Houston gas 
market is the reference point for pricing gas in Mexico is that there be 
sufficient capacity so that the market for gas can always clear at the 
netback price. The obvious question is whether the cost of maintain-
ing such capacity is warranted. This is a very difficult question in that 
there are economic, political and institutional constraints involved in 
the basic question of pricing gas along the Mexican pipelines. 
A benchmark for discussion is the pattern of investment that 
would be followed by a planner who is attempting to maximize a 
measure of welfare. Such a policy may involve periods where the 
capacity constraint binds. The length of this period is a measure of 
the cost of the deviation from "optimal" that results from the policy 
of using the Houston gas market as a benchmark for pricing gas. We 
will show that a policy that insures sufficient pipeline capacity so that 
the gas market can clear at the Houston netback price deviates from 
an "optimal" policy by only a matter of weeks. 
Let us consider a case where pipeline capacity is given by Q. 
Demand is growing at a rate A. Let pM be the price in Monterrey 
based on Houston netback. Assume that demand reaches pipeline 
capacity at t = 0 so that pM = PM for Q < Q and pM = 6(Q). 
If the pipeline capacity binds, pM = 0{Qe
X
i
 and the excess burden 
associated with this bottleneck is given by: 
_ ApAQ _ Q(e
Xt-l)[9(Qe
xt-pM] m 
This is the triangle a-b-c in figure 7. The bottleneck results in 
rents being generated and these rents result in the loss given by GAS MARKETING ACTIVITIES IN MEXICO 27 
X2(t) = 7:QAp = 7lQ[0(Qe
At) - Vm\ (3) 
where 7l is a parameter that can range from 0 to 1, and is the weight 
of the rents generated by the bottleneck in the welfare function. The 
loss in equation (3) represents the fraction of rents that are consumed 
in transfer and reflects such factors as rent seeking and X-inefficiency. 
This is the rectangle pM - pM - a - b in figure 7. Define the total 
loss in welfare as: 
X(t) = X1(t)+X2(t). (4) 
Figure 7 
P 
Opening a second pipeline reduces the marginal costs of transporting 
gas moving the operating range of both pipelines to f. With capacity 
constraints binding, the marginal cost of transportation depends on 
the construction of the new pipeline. The marginal cost of moving gas 
will then be reduced by AMC. This will reduce the cost of moving 28 ESTUDIOS ECONÓMICOS 
gas by <p = AMCQ. Let 72 be the weight of the cost savings of open-
ing a second pipeline in the welfare function. A welfare maximizing 
planner would want to pick the time of opening the second pipeline 
to minimize the welfare loss less the savings in operating costs which 
is given by: 
which can be written as 
= r (7 
Co
 K ' 
We construct a numerical example to calculate the value of Tfor 
those values of the parameters and get a rough approximation of the 
length of the period where it is efficient for the capacity constraint 
to bind. Assume, as before, that a 48-inch pipeline reaches its limit 
capacity at 3,800 million cubic feet per day when it is 100 miles long. 
Figure 8 illustrates the solution of the minimization problem for 
a 48-inch pipeline, 300 miles long. The curve labeled 7l = 1, 72 = 1 
depicts the loss to the consumers. If we examine the curve we see 
that even for a very high rate of return on the order of 30 per cent, 
the "optimal" investment time is about two weeks after the capacity 
constraint begins to bind. For a rate of return of 15 percent, the 
consumers will never want the capacity constraint to bind. Consumers 
of natural gas are willing to pay for the facilities to transport the 
gas they demand at the Houston netback price. Thus it is feasible 
to construct a rate structure that will compensate the operator of 
the pipeline for maintaining sufficient capacity to transport the gas 
demanded at the Houston netback price. Note that such a policy is 
Pareto superior. 




The curve labeled 71 = 0.1, 72 = 1 depicts the welfare loss if 
we assume that 10 percent of the rents transferred to Pemex are lost 
to ^-inefficiencies. For a rate of return of 30 percent, the "optimal" 
period for the capacity constraint to bind is 15 weeks. For a rate 
of return of 15 percent, it is not optimal for the capacity constraint 
to bind. The savings in operating costs are sufficient to warrant the 
investment. 
The curve labeled 7l = 0, 72 = 1 ignores the transfers from 
consumers and includes the savings in oneratinff costs and the dead-
weieht loss The curve labeled -vi = 0 TO = 0 ienores everything 
but the deadweight loss Even using this measure of welfare loss the 
ODtimal Deriod for the constraint to bind is less than one vear for a 
rate of return of 15 percent. 
Tno woatnor in A/Iovi™ Hnoo tint flnr-Hiato no milnti no in tno 
UnitedStltes hoi^ in seasonal bottl^ 
necks do occur. Assume the bottleneck starts at t --Tx and ends 
at t = 12j (see ngure yj. ine weitare loss associated witn sucn a 
bottleneck is then / X(t)dt. It pays to invest in additional pipeline 
Ti 
capacity to eliminate the bottleneck 11: 30 ESTUDIOS ECONÓMICOS 
T2 
JX(t)dt-l2<p 
Ti = X(T2-Ti) -72<P > (8) 
C0 Co - '
 { ' 
where X is the average of welfare loss, (see figure 10). 
Figure 9 
Let AT = T2 - Ti, figure 11 depicts the relationship between AT and 
X for r=0.15. 
Consumers of gas are willing to pay to eliminate a five-day peak 
whose average is 10 percent over capacity. A planner that assigns 
a 10 percent cost to transfers will invest to eliminate a 35-day peak 
whose average is 10 percent over capacity. 
The need for concern about the possibility of capacity constraints 
in gas pipelines follows from projections about demand. Demand for 
natural gas in the Pemex transportation system will grow at an annual 
rate of 11.0%. These estimates are based on increases in the demand 
for natural gas of electricity generation, industrial consumers, and GAS MARKETING ACTIVITIES IN MEXICO  31 
LDC's (see table 1). The northeastern and northwestern regions will 
register a growth of 12% and 18%, respectively, during the 1999 - 2003 
period due to the CFE's projects. (CFE is the national electricity 
monopoly.) These two regions will represent 36% of total market 
demand. 
Figure 10 
In 1999, demand and supply for natural gas in Mexico will be 4,824 
and 4,838 million cubic feet per day (mcfd), respectively, in 2000-2001 
5,096 mcfd and 5,111 mcfd, respectively, and in 2002-2003 5,259 mcfd 
and 5,275 mcfd, respectively. According to the permit granted by CRE 
to Pemex to transport natural gas,
1
6
 Pemex will face this increase in 





 Comisión Reguladora de Energía (1999). This permit states all the technical 
details and investment plans that Pemex will have to fulfill during the next five 
years in its transportation activities. 
1
7
 These calculations are based on estimates of injection znd extraction require-
ments at each node (Comisión Reguladora de Energia (1999), appendix 3.1), flow 32 ESTUDIOS ECONÓMICOS 
Figure 11 
As shown, the increase in pipeline capacity will barely cope with the 
increase in demand, and there could be bottlenecks during peak peri-
ods. Especially important is the 1597 kilometer-long pipeline system 
in the Reynosa and Monterrey operating sectors where a huge in-




A very strong case can be made from these calculations that a 
policy that makes sure that there is always sufficient pipeline capacity 
so that the gas market can always clear should be followed. Such a 
policy would generate sufficient savings to the consumers of gas so 
that they will be willing to pay for such an investment. 
and capacity technical information for each transportation sector (annex 3, ap-
pendix 3.1 and 3.2), repowering needs at each compression station (appendix 3.1), 
and investment needs for expansion of the pipeline network (annex 6.2.1). 
1
8
 There are three compression stations located in these sectors. In the Mon-
terrey sector here are two old reciprocate compression stations: O]0 Cahente, 
pressure and low volumes. In the Keynosa compression 
station tnat was constructed m lyyi. GAS MARKETING ACTIVITIES IN MEXICO 33 
The only argument that can be made against investing in this 
pipeline capacity is that the government loses the revenue created 
by rents to the pipeline. However, the Mexican government can at 
present capture the rents that would be generated by pipeline con-
gestion by taxing gas. If we take as given that additional taxation of 
natural gas is not desired, then a pipeline investment policy that pre-
vents pipeline congestion can be Pareto superior. Consumers would 
be willing to pay for this capacity and the only cost to the government 
is not collecting rents it can now collect and has chosen not to do so. 
Table 1 
Natural Gas Demand: Annual Growth Rates 
by Consumer Type 
1994 - 1997  1997 - 2003 
CFE  7  17 
Industrial  5  5 
Cogeneration  —  76 
Pemex  1  5 
Vehicles  —  51 
Distribution  1  13 
Source: Escenarios de oferta y demanda en el sistema 
nacional de gasoductos de Pemex-Gas, Comisión Regula-
dora de Energía (1999). 
Table 2 
Maximum Average Transport Capacity of 
Pemex's National Pipeline System 
Units  Year 1  Year S  Year 3  Year 4  Year 5 
MMGcal/Year  421.5  445.3  445.3  459.5  459.5 
MMPCD  4,824  5,096  5,096  5,259  5,259 
Source: Comisión Reguladora de Energía (1999). 34 ESTUDIOS ECONÓMICOS 
Conclusions 
Pemex should be permitted to enter into spot contracts or future 
contracts to sell gas. However, the price of gas should always be 
the net back price based on the Houston Ship Channel at the time 
of delivery. Pemex should not be permitted to discount the price 
of gas from the Houston netback price even in a nondiscriminatory 
fashion. This arrangement is transparent, it is easy to enforce and 
does not eliminate any legitimate market options for any of the parties 
involved. Pemex or consumers of gas can use the Houston market for 
hedging speculative transactions. 
The Houston market thus serves as a buffer for fluctuations in 
Pemex's production or in demand. Pemex can vary its sales in the 
Houston market to smooth fluctuation in Mexico. This buffer allows 
Pemex to only sell "plain vanilla" gas without having to engage in 
complex market operations in Mexico. Thus, it is very difficult to see 
what useful role can be played by Pemex acting as a gas marketer in 
Mexico. If Pemex wants to engage in speculative market behavior, 
it can do so in the Houston market. Houston has the advantage of 
being a well-developed market. Pemex's transactions in that market 
would not create any regulatory issues for the CRE as long as Pemex 
sells gas in Mexico at the Houston spot netback price. 
The key to this policy is that there be sufficient investment in 
pipeline capacity so that bottlenecks do not develop. A very strong 
case can be made from our calculations that a policy that makes sure 
that there is always sufficient pipeline capacity should be followed. 
Such a policy would generate sufficient savings to the consumers of gas 
so that they will be willing to pay for such capacity investment in the 
rate structure. The only argument that can be made against investing 
in this pipeline capacity is the loss of revenue created by rents to the 
pipeline. However, the Mexican government can at present capture 
these rents and does not do so. If this is the correct policy, then a 
DiDeline investment policy that prevents pipeline congestion can be 
Pareto superior. 
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